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We build a model to understand educational mismatch and earnings inequality
among highly educated workers. Educational mismatch has a negative wage effect
and a positive correlation with wage inequality, for occupations and college majors.
To disentangle different reasons or channels that contribute to wage inequality, we
identity the three underlying reasons behind the mismatch—preference, promotion,
and search friction—and quantify their impacts. Quantitatively, the preference and
promotion channel negatively contribute to an inequality increase from 1990 to 2000;
the match premium contributes to a 28.4% increase in inequality; and the contribution
of search friction is 5.3%. We conclude that educational mismatch affects earnings
inequality significantly and that the impact varies based on the underlying reasons.
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signaling and lowering market friction.
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1 Introduction
Educational mismatch occurs when a worker’s skill type does not match the job require-
ments, such as in the case of a chemistry major who works as a general manager. This type
of mismatch is different from that in which college graduates work in low-skill jobs. Al-
though the latter has received much attention in the literature (e.g. Sloane (2003), Guiron-
net and Peypoch (2007), Lee et al. (2015)), research on type mismatch is scarce. This study
examines the impact of educational mismatch on residual wage inequality among the
highly educated. Since a substantial portion of inequality remains unexplained by ob-
servations (Violante (2002), Tang et al. (2020)), considering educational mismatch might
be helpful. To disentangle the different channels contributing to wage inequality, we use
survey data to identify the three fundamental reasons behind the mismatch and quan-
tify their impacts. This is meaningful as there is a wide wage variety among mismatched
workers due to different reasons. Although the effect of mismatch on wage inequality
has been discussed in the literature to some extent (Altonji et al. (2014)), no study has
examined the reasons behind the mismatch.
Specifically, we define the educational mismatch by employing the subjective responses
from the National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG) in the United States. The survey
participants were asked about the relatedness between their current occupation and the
field of study in which they have the highest qualification; they were asked to select one of
the following three possible responses: “closely related,” “somewhat related,” and “not
at all related.” We identify a participant with a skill match when the participant’s re-
sponse is “closely related;” otherwise, it is a mismatch.1 For the participant, a mismatch
does not necessarily mean a mistake, as the response reflects the participant’s optimal
behavior. However, it may, at least partially, reflect the knowledge usage efficiency. The
survey also asked about the main reasons behind the mismatch; the data show that 70%
of the mismatch can be attributed to the following three reasons: preference, promotion,
and search friction.2 This study will model the educational mismatch by considering the
aforementioned reasons.
First, we document the wage effect of educational mismatch. Consistent with Ritter
and West (2014), statistically, there is a negative wage effect of educational mismatch. The
average wage ratios of mismatched to matched workers were 0.91, 0.94, and 0.87 in 1990,
2000, and 2010, respectively. In other words, these ratios depict a roughly 10% mismatch
penalty. After controlling for demographic variables, the ratios become 17.1%, 22.9%, and
26.5%, respectively; it implies that, for workers with similar characteristics, the penalty
could be as high as a quarter. Moreover, there is a wage variety among mismatched work-
1As a robustness check, we also define the mismatch only with the response of “not at all.”
2For example, as documented in section 2, in 1990, 32%, 20%, and 16% of the mismatch was attributed to
promotion, preference, and search friction, respectively.
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ers. We group mismatched workers by the three reasons and compute the wage ratios for
each group. The results show that, for example, in 1990, the ratios were 0.98, 0.85, and 0.66
for promotion, preference, and search friction, respectively. There is nearly no penalty for
promotion-induced mismatch, while the penalty for search friction could be as high as
1/3.
We also find a positive correlation between educational mismatch and wage inequal-
ity in the cases of both college majors and occupations. In other words, the occupations
or college majors with high educational mismatch usually have a high wage inequality.
This might be counter-intuitive at first glance, as it may lead to the conclusion that a better
match will amplify the wage difference. However, the inequality depends not only on the
variety within the matched or mismatched workers’ group but also on the labor compo-
nent of these two groups. In principal, there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between
inequality and mismatch degree; however, as per the US data, the inequality is found on
the rising part of the curve. Although this fact does not necessarily imply a causality,
it suggests the potential importance of educational mismatch, especially when we have
already controlled the demographic characteristics. As shown in section 2, in a simple
accounting exercise, educational mismatch contributes toward 15% of the inequality. We
obtain a more sophisticated result by employing our model and conducting a quantitative
analysis.
In the model, workers and firms vary by skill type and productivity type, respectively.
Given a worker’s skill type, there are two types of jobs—matched and mismatched. In
order to get a matched job, it is important for the worker to possess the related skill type,
which will draw a match premium. In this case, the joint output depicts a product of
the firm’s productivity, the worker’s skill, the match premium, and the worker’s effort.
A worker acquires a share of the output as the labor compensation, and promotion is
defined as an increase in this share. The job amenity on a matched job is random and
will affect the worker’s effort. Therefore, the match degree between the worker and the
job affects the human capital level and, eventually, the worker’s occupational choice. In
the quantitative analysis, we calibrate the model to target the US economy in both 1990
and 2000 because the wage inequality increased at a faster pace during these periods.
We also allow both the channel-specific and non-channel-specific parameters to change
across years. Subsequently, by counterfactual analysis, we quantify the contribution of
each channel to the increase in wage inequality.
Theoretically, the underlying channels affect wage inequality through the occupa-
tional choice. In particular, a high level of promotion in a mismatched job, poor job
amenities, or a low match premium in a matched job will lower the likelihood of ac-
cepting the matched job. Search friction on a matched job will also affect the employment
distribution. This will affect the wage inequality through changes in the labor component
and human capital quality. Quantitatively, we find that the preference and promotion
channel contributes negatively to the wage inequality increase, and the match premium
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contributes 28.4% and search friction contributes 5.3%. Given that we only focus on the
residual wage inequality, and the fact that the model does not include the worker’s abil-
ity or the heterogeneity in firm productivity, we think that the effect of the mismatch is
significant.
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we explain the
residual wage inequality by introducing the educational mismatch in a structural model.
Second, we measure the educational mismatch in a novel and direct way by employing
survey data. Third, we identify the underlying reasons behind the mismatch to disentan-
gle different mechanisms contributing to the inequality. Fourth, we find that educational
mismatch significantly affects earnings inequality and that the impact varies based on the
underlying reasons.
Related Literature
The related literature primarily includes studies on wage inequality and Educational and
skill mismatch. There is a growing number of studies on wage inequality for the highly
educated. The literature documents that there has been a rapid increase in wage inequal-
ity since the 1980s (e.g., Autor et al. (2008), Piketty and Saez (2014)). Skill premium has
been studied intensively (e.g., Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Burstein et al. (2015)). There
have been several studies on wage inequality among educational groups (e.g., Violante
(2002), Lee et al. (2015), Tang et al. (2020)).
Studies on within-group or residual wage inequality emphasize the impact of unob-
served skills (e.g., Lemieux (2006)). The findings of Violante (2002) and Kambourov and
Manovskii (2009) are closely related to our study. The former study emphasizes the role of
skill transferability across machines of different vintages in explaining wage differences
among ex-ante workers; the author finds that this channel could explain one third of the
residual wage inequality. The latter study connects occupational mobility with wage in-
equality by emphasizing occupation-specific human capital. Although the authors con-
clude that occupational mobility would explain most of the residual wage inequality, they
attribute occupational mobility to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Since the aforemen-
tioned study does not identify the fundamental reasons behind the shocks, the present
study complements it by providing some specific reasons behind the occupational choice.
Recent studies on high-skilled workers have focused on the match between skill type
and jobs. While Altonji et al. (2014) argue that the earnings difference across college ma-
jors can be larger than the skill premium between college and high school and that the
substantial wage widening or earnings inequality between college majors is related to the
task composition of occupations chosen by majors. Ritter and West (2014) found that the
changing distribution of college majors causes slight, if any, shift in earnings distribution.
Based on the results of these two studies, our study goes one step further and asks the
reason behind the educational mismatch, given the wage difference between occupations
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of people with the same major. We also ask to what extent mismatch accounts for the
increase in wage inequality among the highly educated.
Studies on educational mismatch usually investigate the wage effect of mismatch be-
tween college majors and occupations. Robst (2007) is one of the pioneers in employing
NSCG data to measure educational mismatch. Lemieux (2014) shows that the return on
education varies greatly depending on occupation, the field of study, and the match be-
tween these two factors. It is observed that the college major match-related channel ac-
counts for close to half of the conventionally measured return to education. Other studies
have also shown empirical results between field studies and earnings difference (e.g., Ar-
cidiacono (2004), Freeman and Hirsch (2008), Nordin et al. (2010), Kirkeboen et al. (2016)).
The present study is also related to the literature on skill mismatch (e.g., Guvenen
et al. (2020), Lise and Postel-Vinay (2015)). In these studies, the skill level is measured
using a test score such as the ASVAB and the skill requirements in each occupation. Skill
mismatch is measured as the distance between a worker’s skill acquirement and the job’s
skill requirement. In a recent study, Cooper and Liu (2019) measured the mismatch be-
tween skills and educational attainment. Studies on skill mismatch in countries, other
than the United States, for example, Desjardins and Rubenson (2011) measure it using
the European data. In another study, Gil et al. (2020) examine the skill mismatch due to
immigration.
The model setup is close to Berliant et al. (2006) who build a model to illustrate the
exchange of knowledge as well as its consequences for agglomerative activity in a general-
equilibrium search-theoretic framework. The idea of occupational choice is close to Rosen
(1986).
Organization of the Paper The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes statistical and empirical facts. In Section 3, we build a model on ed-
ucational mismatch, incorporating underlying reasons behind the mismatch. Section 4
describes the stationary equilibrium, and the quantitative analysis is presented in section
5. Section 6 presents quantitative results under alternative calibration strategies. Section
7 concludes the paper.
2 Facts
Some main features related to educational mismatch are documented in this section. Data
is collected from the NSCG, which is a census survey of people with a college degree.
Every 10 years, it provides information about the relatedness between each sampled in-
dividual’s field of study and the individual’s occupation. The survey participants choose
from one of the following responses on the questions on relatedness: “closely related,”
“somewhat related,” and “not at all related.” We consider the participant to have a skill
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match if the response is “closely related,” otherwise it is mismatched.3
The sample includes NSCG (1993, 2003, and 2013) data based on the censuses of 1990,
2000, and 2010, respectively. It adopts the following trimming strategy : it only includes
full-time workers aged between 16 and 65 years. The top annual earnings are 4 million,
and earnings less than 2,800 dollar are excluded. Concerning race, the study only consid-
ers white, black, and Hispanic races. Following the methodology in Altonji et al. (2014),
the major code is regrouped under the 50 major categories listed in the Department of
Education. Subsequently, occupation is regrouped under the method proposed by Dorn
(2009), who develops a consistent three-digit occupation code. The data considers four
levels of schooling year: 16, 18, 19, and 21 years. These levels are regrouped into three
categories: Bachelor’s (16), Master’s (18, 19), and Doctorate (21). In addition, tenure is
calculated as a potential experience, that is, max(age − schooling − 6, 0). We obtain the
wage residue based on the following regression, as in Kambourov and Manovskii (2009),
ln(wage) = constant + β1edu + β2exp + i.gender + i.race + ǫ (1)
where ln(wage) is the log value of annual earnings, edu is the education level, and exp
is the potential experience in the labor market; gender and race are also controlled. The
residual wage is the exponential of this residue, exp(ǫ), and wage inequality is the resid-
ual wage inequality measured as variance of residue, var(ǫ). In this study, all the analyses
focus on this residual wage inequality.
2.1 Statistical Description
Table A.1 through Table A.3 present several characteristics of the data, including the ob-
servations, average tenure, earnings, inequality, and employment share for different de-
mographic groups from 1990 to 2010. In the sample, the wage inequality increases from
0.23 in 1990 to 0.39 in 2010. Men have higher earnings and wage inequality than women.
The annual earning increases with the education level; however, the Master’s level work-
ers have the lowest wage inequality. White people earn higher wages and have higher
inequality than other racial groups. The proportion of job relatedness does not change
substantially—the proportion of closely related jobs is around 0.56. However, even if the
match premium increases, educational mismatch would continue to contribute toward
earnings inequality. In addition, if the main reason behind this mismatch changes, then
this change would also influence earnings inequality.
Table A.4 lists several inequalities. In this table, Varraw depicts the wage inequality—
with raw data—that is, the variance of log of wages var(ln(wage)); Varres is the residual
wage inequality; var1 is the residual wage inequality after further controlling the major
3As a robustness check, we also define the mismatch only with the response of “not at all related.”
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dummy, and var2 is the residual wage inequality after further controlling the variables
of major, occupation, and match status. Thus, the contribution of the major-occupation
match is accounted as var1−var2var1 . Subsequently, it shows that, in statistical terms, the edu-
cational mismatch contributes toward 15% of the inequality. As it is a simply accounting
exercise, we will build a model and conduct a quantitative analysis in the later sections.
Table A.5 lists the proportion of match degree in different demographic groups. We
define the job relatedness as the percentage of people whose response is “closely related”
and use it as the proxy of match degree. There is not much difference in match degree
among the gender and racial groups. However, job relatedness increases with an increase
in the educational level. For example, in 1990, it increased from 0.46 for Bachelor’s degree
to 0.88 for Doctorate; for the other two years, similar differences were observed.
Table A.6 shows the reasons behind the mismatch. In the survey, people were asked
about the most important reason behind working outside their fields; the table lists all the
seven potential reasons, and the proportion for each reason is calculated for each year.
The data shows that there are three main reasons behind the mismatch: pay or promotion
opportunities, career interests, and the unavailability of a job in their highest degree field.
Roughly, these three factors constitute around 70% of the mismatch reported for each
year.4
Table A.8 presents the wage ratios between the matched and the mismatched workers;
these ratios are grouped by the aforementioned reasons. In the raw data, the average
wage for matched workers is higher than that of the mismatched workers, regardless of
the reason. However, for the residual wage, the mismatched group with the reason “Pay,
promotion opportunity” reports a higher or almost the same wage as that of the matched
workers. This implies wage variety in the mismatched workers’ group. The data shows
that, for example, in 1990, the ratios were 0.98, 0.85, and 0.66 for promotion, preference,
and search friction, respectively. Hence, it would be meaningful to distinguish between
the reasons and study the wage inequality.5
2.2 Wage Effect
This subsection documents the wage effect of educational mismatch. As in Ritter and
West (2014), we regress the log annual earning on the demographic and match variables
4Table A.7 presents the reasons behind the mismatch for a worker with an experience of less than 10
years, and the result is quite similar. Kambourov and Manovskii (2009)reports that it typically takes 10 years
to become an experienced worker. This rule is also applied in Ritter and West (2014). In our study, we will
include both the experienced and inexperienced worker, but we will control for tenure.
5Table A.9 shows the wage ratio between the matched and the mismatched group for inexperienced work-
ers, and the result is somewhat similar.
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as follows,
ln(earnings)ijm = βDi + αZj + θMm + δ1closejm + δ2somejm + γXi + ǫijm,
where ln(earnings)ijm is the log value of annual earning for individual i in occupation
j who graduated with major m; Di includes a vector of demographic variables (tenure,
tenure2, gender, education, and race), for individual i; Zj denotes the occupation j, and
Mm denotes the major m. The terms closejm and somejm denote that the occupation j and
the major m are closely related and somewhat related, respectively. Xi includes all the
other factors for individual i—parents’ education, degree location, and work location.
Finally, ǫijm depicts the residual term. Therefore, δ1 and δ2 capture the wage effect of
the mismatch. In particular, δ1(δ2) represents the percentage of change in earnings when
mismatched workers become closely (somewhat) related.
Table 1: Wage effect of educational mismatch
VARIABLES 1990 2000 2010
closely related 0.171*** 0.229*** 0.265***
(0.00450) (0.00687) (0.00681)
some related 0.118*** 0.170*** 0.160***
(0.00450) (0.00690) (0.00688)
exp 0.0361*** 0.0386*** 0.0441***
(0.000651) (0.00101) (0.000796)
male 0.158*** 0.206*** 0.165***
(0.00332) (0.00498) (0.00479)
hgc 0.0681*** 0.0666*** 0.0858***
(0.00134) (0.00212) (0.00203)
black -0.0381*** -0.0519*** -0.107***
(0.00620) (0.00924) (0.00900)
Constant 9.395*** 9.711*** 9.348***
(0.0256) (0.103) (0.108)
Observations 92,802 55,039 62,452
R-squared 0.354 0.334 0.380
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This is the result of the regression of
ln(earnings)ijm = βDi + αZj + θMm + δ1closejm + δ2somejm + γXi + ǫijm,
where Di includes a vector of demographic variables (tenure, tenure
2, gender, education, and race) for indi-
vidual i. Zj denotes the job j, and Mm denotes the major m. The terms closejm and somejm denote that the job
j and the major m are closely related and somewhat related, respectively. Xi includes all the other factors for
individual i—parents’ education, degree location, and work location. ǫijm is the residual term. Data source:
National Survey of College Graduates (1993, 2003, 2013).
Table 1 presents a part of the regression results. It shows that δ1 = 0.171, δ2 = 0.118
in 1990; δ1 = 0.229, δ2 = 0.170 in 2000; and δ1 = 0.265, δ2 = 0.160 in 2010. The result
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δ1 > δ2 > 0 suggests that a mismatch has a significant negative effect on earnings (e.g.,
17.1% in 1990). Moreover, the results show that the effect of educational mismatch is
becoming larger over time. The matched workers (closely related) have 17.1%, 22.9%,
and 26.5% higher annual earnings in 1990, 2000, and 2010, respectively, than those of the
mismatched workers (not related at all).
2.3 Wage Inequality Effect
To discern the relationship between the educational mismatch and wage inequality, we
plot the correlation between job relatedness and wage inequality in the cases of college
majors or occupations for different years. Figure A.1 displays the case of majors where
each point represents one major. The relatedness is calculated as the proportion of matched
workers (job closely related) in this major,6 and wage inequality is the variance of log
value of the residual annual earning, controlling for demographic characteristics (var(ǫ))
in each major. It shows a negative correlation between job relatedness and wage inequal-
ity across majors. Moreover, to find out the correlation significance, we do a simple re-
gression as
var(ǫ)j = β ∗ relatednessj + ηj,
and Table 2 presents the result. It shows that the correlation is negative and significant,
with values of -0.146, -0.278, and -0.157 in 1990, 2000, and 2010, respectively. Although
it is not necessary to imply the causality, it suggests that job relatedness is potentially
important even within majors. Similarly, Figure A.3 plots the job relatedness and wage




related -0.146*** -0.278*** -0.157**
(0.0341) (0.0711) (0.0673)
Constant 0.277*** 0.439*** 0.407***
(0.0186) (0.0382) (0.0363)
Observations 45 44 44
R-squared 0.300 0.267 0.115
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note This is the regression result of
var(ǫ)j = β ∗ relatednessj + ηj,
where var(ǫ)j is the residual wage inequality in major j, relatednessj is the job relatedness in major j, ηj is the
residual term. Data source: National Survey of College Graduates.
6Figure A.2 presents the case of measuring job relatedness as the percentage of people who responds
“some close” or “very close”.
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relatedness -0.0685** -0.206*** -0.199***
(0.0327) (0.0601) (0.0611)
Constant 0.208*** 0.360*** 0.379***
(0.0195) (0.0376) (0.0388)
Observations 64 67 69
R-squared 0.066 0.153 0.137
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note This is the regression result of
var(ǫ)j = β ∗ relatednessj + ηj,
where var(ǫ)j is the residual wage inequality in occupation j, relatednessj is the job relatedness in occupation
j, ηj is the residual term. Data source: National Survey of College Graduates.
inequality across occupations,7 and it also shows a negative correlation. Furthermore,
Table 3 shows that the correlation is significant, with the value of -0.0685, -0.206, and -0.199
in 1990, 2000, and 2010, respectively. This also suggests that job relatedness is potentially
important even within occupations.
This might be counter-intuitive at first glance as it may lead to the conclusion that a
match will amplify the wage difference. However, the inequality depends on not only va-
riety within matched or mismatched workers but also the component of these two groups.
In principal, there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between inequality and mismatch
degree; however, as per the US data, the inequality is found on the rising part of the curve.
3 The Model
In this section, we will present a tractable model incorporating the underlying reasons
behind the educational mismatch. It only contains discrete type of variables, and a more
general model with continuous type is presented in the online Appendix. A worker has
skills in two dimensions (a, k), where a represents the skill level and k represents the
skill type. A firm has productivity in two dimensions (A, k
′
), where A represents the
productivity level and k
′
represents the firm’s type. To measure the mismatch, following
Berliant et al. (2006), we assume that k and k
′
are in a cycle of [0, 1], with a total length of
1; the distance between 0 and 1 is 0, and the maximal distance for any two points on the
cycle is 12 . This distance between the skill type k and the productivity type k
′
reflects the
degree of the educational mismatch. Later on, in order to make model tractable and focus
7Figure A.2 presents the case of measuring job relatedness as the percentage of people who responds
“some close” or “very close”.
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on the type mismatch, we assume that productivity A and skill a are homogeneous and
normalize them to 1.
Production
The joint output between a worker and a firm is linear; it depicts a firm’s productivity
A, worker’s skill level a, work effort e, and the match premium between the worker and
the firm h(k, k
′
), that is, y(a, k, k
′
) = Aah(k, k
′
)e. A worker takes α share of the joint out-
put as labor compensation, that is, w(a, k, k
′
) = αy(a, k, k
′
), and the promotion is modeled
as an increase in α. There are different ways to model the promotion; however, as per
the survey, given that the promotion and the pay are categorized together by the rea-
son behind the mismatch (see Table A.6), it is straightforward to model it this way. In
addition, the promotion level in a matched job is always α0, and the promoted value is
α1(> α0). Given the assumption of homogeneous ability and productivity and the ex-
ogenous offer arrival and distribution, modeling a higher promotion α is the same as a
higher output. The match premium decreases in the distance between job and worker’s
type d(k, k
′
) and will be effective only if they are close enough or spread in the match-
specific knowledge, as in Berliant et al. (2006). In particular, there is a cutoff δk such that
the match premium is hL if d(k, k
′
) ≥ δk, and it is hH(> hL) if d(k, k
′
) < δk. We assume that







= hL d(k, k
′
) ≥ δ














where θ captures risk aversion, ρ captures the elasticity of effort, and τ denotes the job
preference. A large τ implies high job amenity or a low disutility of effort. The distribution
of preference level for a matched job is across three values {τL, τM, τH}, where τL < τM <
τH, and, in a non-matched job, it is τM. Hence, in the matched job, the preference level
could be τL or τH. After τ is realized, worker’s utility maximization implies the following
wage function: w(α, A, a, h, τ) = [(αAah)1−ρτ]
1
θ−ρ and effort function e(α, A, a, h, τ) =
[(αAah)−(θ−1)τ]
1
θ−ρ . Subsequently, the indirect utility function is
U(α, A, a, h, τ) = −
θ − ρ




Given the assumption that ρ < 1 < θ, wages and utility increase in α, A, a, h, τ, while
effort increases in τ but decreases in α, A, a, h.
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We proceed with further assumptions. Workers are assumed to have the same skill
level a, which is normalized to 1; firms are homogeneous in productivity (A = 1). These
simplifications are made because of the following two reasons. First, this study only ex-
amines inequality for the highly educated workers for whom the skill difference could
be small. Second, the focus of this model is type mismatch; hence, productivity and skill
differences are omitted.
Value function
For a worker who is working in a matched job (S) with preference τ, the instant utility is
U(α0, hH, τ); in this case, we simplify the notation by denoting U(α, h, τ) = U(α, 1, 1, h, τ).
For the next period, there is a probability of Ps that the job and worker will be sepa-
rated. If they are not separated, there is a probability Pδ that the worker will be offered
a matched job from outside. The job amenity in any matched job is τ
′
, which is drawn
from {τL, τM, τH}. With a probability of (1 − Pδ), the worker will receive an offer for a
mismatched job (g). For the mismatched job, with a probability of Pα, the promotion level
is α1. There is a probability (1 − Pα) that the promotion is α0. In both cases, the worker
chooses between accepting and rejecting the job offer. Hence, the value function can be
written as
Vs(τ) = U(α0, hH, τ) + βEτ′ {PsVU + (1 − Ps)[PδVs(τ
′
)
+ (1 − Pδ){Pαmax[Vg(α1), Vs(τ
′
)] + (1 − Pα)max[Vg(α0), Vs(τ
′
)]}]},
where β is the time discount rate in the utility function.
For the worker in a mismatched job with promotion α, since the match premium is hL
and the preference is τM the indirect utility function is U(α, hL, τM). For the next period,
there is a probability of Ps that the job and worker will be separated. If they are not sepa-
rated, there is a probability of Pδ that the worker will be offered a matched job outside the
firm with a promotion level of α0, of which the preference is τ
′
drawn from {τL, τM, τH}.
There is a probability of (1 − Pδ) that the worker will receive an offer for a mismatched
job with the same promotion level. Subsequently, the value function is as follows:
Vg(α) = U(α, hL, τM) + βEτ′ {PsVU + (1 − Ps)[(1 − Pδ)Vg(α) + Pδmax[Vg(α), Vs(τ
′
)]]}.
An unemployed worker will have an unemployment benefit V̄ in the current period. In
the next period, there is a probability of Pf that this worker will receive an offer. There
is a probability of Pδ that it is a matched job with preference from a random draw and a
probability of (1 − Pδ) that it is a mismatched job with a promotion level of α0. The value
function can then be written as follows:
VU = V̄ + βEτ′ {(1 − Pf )VU + Pf [PδVs(τ
′
) + (1 − Pδ)Vg(α0)]}
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In the model, mismatch happens when Vg(α) > Vs(τ), for all (α, τ). Let D(α) be the set
of preferences on a matched job where a mismatch happens, that is, D(α) = {τ : Vg(α) >
Vs(τ)}. In this case, the profile for mismatch is {(α1, τ) : τ ∈ D(α1)} and {(α0, τ) : τ ∈
D(α0)}. A mismatch through occupational choice is differentiated into two parts based
on the following two underlying reasons: preference and promotion. Subsequently, the
set of promotion is PM = {(α1, τ) : τ ∈ D(α1), andτ /∈ D(α0)} and others are due to
preference.
In the model, firm’s behavior is passive. There is no firm entry, and the offer’s dis-
tribution is also exogenous. Although the firm effect is substantial, as documented in
the literature (e.g. Song et al. (2019)), we simplify it to focus on the occupational choice.
We consider the possibility wherein an endogenous distribution might amplify the sort-
ing between a worker and firms, which might eventually increase the wage inequality.
Although we do not model it explicitly, we allow the knowledge spread change in the
quantitative analysis, which will capture this effect to some extent.
4 Equilibrium
Definition
An equilibrium consists employment allocation {NU , Ns, Ng0, Ng1}, where NU is the num-
ber of unemployment, Ns is the employment in matched job, Ng0 is the employment in
mismatched job with promotion level α0, and Ng1 is the employment in mismatched job
with promotion level α1. In every period, workers make an occupational choice based on
the current status (α, τ, h) to maximize the expected utility {VU , Vs(τ), Vg(α)}. In the sta-
tionary equilibrium, the employment distribution requires satisfying the following con-
ditions:
1. The unemployed workers include unlucky job seekers and unlucky employed work-
ers
NU = NU(1 − Pf ) + (Ng0 + Ng1 + Ns)Ps
2. The workers in mismatched jobs with promotion α0 comprise lucky job seekers,
stayers, and switchers from matched jobs
Ng0 = NU Pf (1 − Pδ) + Ng0Pr(g0|g0) + NsPr(g0|s)
where Pr(g0|g0) is the probability for staying in a mismatched job with promotion
α0; Pr(g0|s) is the probability for switching from a matched job
3. The workers in a mismatched job with promotion α1 are stayers and switchers from
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matched jobs
Ng1 = Ng1Pr(g1|g1) + NsPr(g1|s)
where Pr(g1|g1) is the probability for staying in a mismatched job with promotion
α1; Pr(g1|s) is the probability for switching from a matched job
4. The workers in a matched job are lucky job seekers, switchers from mismatched
jobs, and stayers
Ns = NU Pf Pδ + Ng0Pr(s|g0) + NsPr(s|s)
where Pr(s|s) is the probability for staying in a matched job; Pr(s|g0) is the proba-
bility for switching from a mismatched job with promotion α0.
5. The total number of labor force is normalized to 1, leading to the following
1 = NU + Ng0 + Ng1 + Ns
Table 4: Multiple equilibria
Equilibrium D(α0) D(α1) PM PF
Eq1 {τL} {τL, τM, τH} {(α1, τM), (α1, τH)} {(α0, τL), (α1, τL)}
Eq2 {τL} {τL, τM} {(α1, τM)} {(α0, τL), (α1, τL)}
Eq3 {τL} {τL}  {(α0, τL), (α1, τL)}
Eq4  {τL, τM, τH} {(α1, τL), (α1, τM), (α1, τH)} 
Eq5  {τL, τM} {(α1, τL), (α1, τM)} 
Eq6  {τL} {(α1, τL)} 
Eq7    
Note This table lists all seven equilibria. Columns “D(α0)” and “D(α1)” represent the set of job amenities
of a job switcher when the promotion level is α0, and , α1, respectively. The columns “PM” and “PF” list the
combination of promotion levels and amenities due to promotion and preference, respectively.
Equilibrium results
Theoretically, there are potential multiple equilibria listed in Table 4, but there are only
two equilibria with non-empty sets (Eq1, Eq2). As shown in the quantitative part, only
Eq1 can match the data. Hence, we will only focus on this equilibrium.8 This equilib-
rium is characterized as D(α0) = {τL} and D(α1) = {τL, τM, τH}, and the profile of a
mismatched worker is {(α0, τL), (α1, τL), (α1, τM), (α1, τH)}. Furthermore, a mismatch due
to promotion is described as the following case. When given a promotion level of α1, peo-
ple will choose a mismatched task; however, if the promotion level is downgraded to α0,
the worker will choose a matched task. By this rule, the set for a promotion-driven mis-
matched worker is (α1, τM), (α1, τH), and the set for preference is {(α0, τL), (α1, τL)}. The
employment and wages are computed in Appendix B and are summarized as follows.
8In the quantitative analysis, we will allow the model to choose an equilibrium to match the data.
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Employment First, NU , Ns, Ng0, Ng1 are computed by solving the equilibrium condi-
tions. Let NPF, NPM, NSF be the number of total employment mismatched owing to prefer-
ence, promotion, and search friction, respectively; NsL, NsM, NsH are the number of work-
ers in a matched job with preference τL, τM, andτH, respectively. They are then computed
in Equation (2) through Equation (7).
Wages Let wPF, wPM, wSF be the wages of mismatched workers due to preference, pro-
motion, and search friction, respectively; wsL, wsM, wsH are the wages of matched workers
with the preferences τL, τM, τH, respectively. Furthermore, wg, ws are the average wages
of mismatched and matched workers, respectively. Given the wage function w(α, h, τ) =
[(αh)1−ρτ]
1
θ−ρ , they are computed in Equation (8) through Equation (15).
Earnings inequality The total inequality can be decomposed into within-group inequal-






[Varj + ( ¯lnwj − ¯lnw)
2]





(lnw(αj, hL, τM)− ¯lnwg)
2





(lnw(α0, hH, τj)− ¯lnws)
2.
Given all the functions in Appendix B, in the next section, we will quantify the impact of
the educational mismatch on earnings inequality.
5 Quantitative analysis
In the quantitative analysis, we first calibrate the model with the data for 1990 as the
benchmark. Subsequently, we re-calibrate the channel-specific and non-channel specific
parameters in the model by targeting the economy in 2000. Finally, given the parameters
in 1990 and 2000, we conduct several counterfactual experiments to examine the impact of
each factor on wage inequality. We perform the analysis only for these two years because
the wage inequality increases rapidly until 2000. As shown in Table A.1 and Table A.2, it
increases from 0.23 in 1990 to 0.34 in 2000 and it turns to 0.39 in 2010.
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5.1 Calibration
The following parameters need to be calibrated: the preference parameters τH, τM, τL, and
PH, PM, PL; the promotion parameters α0, α1, Pα; the search friction parameters Pδ, Pf , Ps;
the skill premium parameters hL, hH; the unemployment benefit V̄; the elasticity of effort
ρ; the risk aversion parameter θ; and the time discount β. First, we normalize the fol-
lowing parameters: match premium in a mismatched job (hL = 1) and preference in a
mismatched job (τM = 1). Following the literature, we set θ = 2 and β = 0.95. Other
parameters are calibrated by jointly targeting several main characteristics.
Table 5: Parameters in 1990
Parameters Descriptions Value target data model
α0 promotion level (low) 0.34 ls 0.60 0.43
α1 promotion level (high) 0.99 Varg 0.27 0.19








τH job amenity(high) 13.87 Vars 0.22 0.24
















Pf job finding rate 0.75 Nu 0.05 0.05




V̄ unemployment disutility -576.24 NSFNg 0.19 0.19
ρ elasticity on effort -4.09 Var 0.23 0.23
Note: The data is from NSCG (1993), which collects the information for 1990; the targets are the following: la-
bor share (ls); matched to mismatched employment ratio ( NsNg
) and wage ratio (
Wg
Ws
); matched to mismatched






), and search friction (
NSF
Ng
); wage ratios be-










inequality within matched group (Vars), wage inequality within the unmatched group (Varg) and total wage
inequality (Var); and unemployment rate (NU).
Table 5 presents the calibration results in 1990. The terms (α0, α1) are promotion levels
(low, high). Pα is the promotion probability, hH is the match premium, (τH, τL) are job
amenities (high, low), and (PH, PM, PL) are the probability distributions on the job amenity
with PH + PM + PL = 1. The term Pδ is the knowledge spread, and the terms (Pf , Ps) are
the job finding and separation rates. The terms (V̄, ρ) are the unemployment disutility
and the elasticity of effort.
The data is from NSCG (1993), and the targets are the following: the labor share (ls);




); employment components of mismatched workers by promotion ( NPMNg ),
preference ( NPFNg ), and search friction (
NSF
Ng
); wage ratios between mismatched and matched
workers by promotion (WPMWs ), preference (
WPF
Ws
), and search friction (WSFWs ); wage inequality
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within the matched and mismatched group (Vars, Varg) and the wage inequality for all
the highly educated (Var); and unemployment rate (Nu). Again, the wage inequality is
the residual term, that is, var(ǫ). Overall, the model matches the data quite well, partic-






, and NSFNg . The
fitness of these variables is important as the model studies inequality through occupa-
tional choice.
The following parameter values need some explanation. First, α1 = 0.99 implies that
the worker will take most of the output in the promoted job; this happens because, in the
production function, labor is the only input. By assumption, there are only two promotion
levels. Second, the large job amenity difference τH/τL = 13.87/0.01 might also be the
result of the assumption that the preference is drawn from the discrete distribution. The
other parameters are discussed in the next subsection.
Table 6: Parameters in 2000
Parameters Descriptions Value target data model
α0 promotion level (low) 0.30 ls 0.60 0.41
α1 promotion level (high) 0.99 Varg 0.40 0.19








τH job amenity(high) 3.17 Vars 0.31 0.38
















Pf job finding rate 0.94 Nu 0.05 0.05




V̄ unemployment disutility -343.73 NSFNg 0.15 0.15
ρ elasticity on effort -2.22 Var 0.34 0.34
Note: The data is taken from NSCG (2003), which collects the information for 2000. The targets are as fol-
lows: labor share (ls); matched to mismatched employment ratio ( NsNg
























); wage inequality within the matched group (Vars), wage inequality within the unmatched group
(Varg) and the total wage inequality (Var); and unemployment rate (NU).
5.2 Counterfactual Analysis
To quantify the contribution of each channel, we re-calibrate both channel-specific and
non-channel-specific parameters by targeting the economy in 2000. The result is shown in
Table 6, and similar to the result for the period 1990, overall, the model matches the data
well, particularly for inequalities and employment ratios. Several things have changed
from 1990 to 2000. The difference in the promotion level (α1/α0) has increased from
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0.99/0.34 to 0.99/0.30, and promotion probability has increased from 0.09 to0.12, and
hence the change in promotion channel will potentially enlarge the wage inequality. The
match premium (hH) has also increased from 2.05 to 3.76, which will also potentially
increase the wage gap between matched and mismatched workers. Job amenity differ-
ence (τH/τL) has decreased from 13.87/0.01 to 3.17/0.01, and probability distribution
(PH, PM, PL) has changed from (0.54, 0.11, 0.35) to (0.36, 0.22, 0.42). The decrease in the
high amenity level and an increase in its probability led the the preference channel to
contribute negatively to the increase in wage inequality. The knowledge spread (Pδ) has
slightly increased, from 0.83 to 0.87; the job finding rate has increased from 0.75 to 0.94,
and the job separation rate has slightly increased from 0.04 to 0.05. These changes may in-
crease the wage inequality by increasing the wage gap between matched and mismatched
workers. Finally, we also re-calibrate two non-channel specific parameters to capture all
the impact from residues, that is, anything else not being included in the model. Since
there are significant changes in both V̄ (from −576.24 to −343.73) and ρ (from −4.09 to
−2.22), the impact from residues could be large.
Table 7: Counterfactual analysis: Preference
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model
τL τH (τL, τH) (PL, PM, PH) Preference(PF)(1990) (2000) (1990)
0.232 0.336 0.232
0.251 0.158 0.174 0.226 0.184
0.019 -0.074 -0.058 -0.006 -0.048
0.183 -0.712 -0.558 -0.058 -0.462
Note: The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark that
is calibrated with the data for 1990. The columns under “Counterfactual analysis” list the wage inequality
under different counterfactual cases. The column τL represents the result that replaces τL in 1990 with the
value in 2000 and retains others with the benchmark values. Similar exercises are conducted for the columns
of “τH”, “(τL, τH)”, and “(PL, PM, PH)”, and the column of “Preference(PF)” is the result derived after replac-
ing (τL, τH) and (PL, PM, PH). In each column of the counterfactual analysis, the first row shows the inequality
level when replacing the parameter in 1990 with that in 2000. The second row shows the difference in inequal-
ity between the counterfactual case and that of the benchmark, where a negative value implies that inequality
in the counterfactual case is smaller than that of the benchmark value. The third row shows the ratio of the
value in the second row to the wage inequality change from 1990 to 2000.
Given the parameters in 1990 and 2000, several counterfactual experiments are con-
ducted to examine the impact of each factor on inequality. First, the parameters of pref-
erence (τL, τH, PL, PM, PH) in 1990 are replaced with the values in 2000. In Table 7, the
columns under “Wage inequality” list the residual wage inequality, based on the data
for 1990 and 2000 and on the benchmark model calibrated with the data for 1990. The
columns under “Counterfactual analysis” list the wage inequalities under different coun-
terfactual cases. The column τL represents the result of replacing τL and retaining others
with the benchmark values. Similar exercises are conducted for the columns of “τH”,
“(τL, τH)”, and “(PL, PM, PH)”, and the column of “Preference(PF)” is the result derived
after replacing all the parameters of preference (τL, τH, PL, PM, PH). In each column of the
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counterfactual analysis, the first row depicts the inequality level when replacing the pa-
rameter in 1990 with that in 2000. The second row shows the difference in inequality
between the counterfactual case and the benchmark, where the negative value means that
the inequality in the counterfactual case is smaller than that of the benchmark value. The
third row shows the ratio of the value in the second row to the wage inequality change
from 1990 to 2000.
As shown in Table 7, the probability distribution plays an important role in explain-
ing the increase in wage inequality. In particular, if (PL, PM, PH) are replaced, the wage
inequality change will be −5.8% of the change in the data. We conclude that the amenity
probability distribution contributes −5.8% to the increase in wage inequality. In addition,
if the job amenity level (τL, τH) is replaced, the wage inequality change will be −55.8% of
the change in the data. This result is consistent with the calibration result that, in 1990, the
difference between τH and τL will be considerably larger than that in 2000. In addition, if
both (τL, τH), and (PL, PM, PH) are replaced, the inequality will be −46.2% of the change in
the data. Therefore, overall, the preference channel contributes negatively to the increase
in wage inequality.
Table 8: Counterfactual analysis: Match premium
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model





Note: The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark
that is calibrated with data from 1990. The column of “(hH)match premium(PE)” represents the result that
replaces hH in 1990 with the value in 2000 and retains others with the benchmark values. In the column of
counterfactual analysis, the first row shows the inequality level when replacing the parameter in 1990 with
that in 2000. The second row shows the difference in inequality between the counterfactual case and that
of the benchmark, where the negative value means that the inequality in the counterfactual case is smaller
than that of the benchmark value. The third row shows the ratio of the value in the second row to the wage
inequality change from 1990 to 2000.
A similar experiment is conducted for match premium (hH). As shown in Table 8,
if hH is replaced, the inequality change is 61.5% of the change in the data. Given that
the match premium increases from 2.05 to 3.76, this exercise suggests that the increase
in match premium contributes to an increase in wage inequality by 61.5%. For search
friction, three parameters are considered: the job finding rate (Pf ), the separation rate (Ps),
and the knowledge spread (Pδ). As shown in Table 9, the contribution of each channel is
5.8%, 0%, 5.8%, respectively. The overall contribution of search friction is 11.5%.
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Table 9: Counterfactual analysis: Search friction
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model
Pδ Pf Ps search_friction(SF)(1990) (2000) (1990)
0.232 0.336 0.232
0.238 0.232 0.238 0.244
0.006 0 0.006 0.012
0.058 0 0.058 0.115
Note: The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark
that is calibrated with data from 1990. The column of “Pδ” represents the result that replaces Pδ in 1990
with the value in 2000 and retains others with benchmark values. Similar exercises are conducted for the
columns of “Pf ” and “Ps”, and the column of “search_friction(SF)” is the result that is derived after replacing
(Pδ, Pf , Ps). In each column of the counterfactual analysis, the first row shows the inequality level when
replacing the parameter in 1990 with that in 2000. The second row shows the difference in inequality between
the counterfactual case and that of the benchmark, where the negative value means that inequality the in
counterfactual case is smaller than that of the benchmark value. The third row shows the ratio of the value
in the second row to the wage inequality change from 1990 to 2000.
Table 10: Counterfactual analysis: promotion
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model
Pα α0 α1 (α0, α1) promotion(PM)(1990) (2000) (1990)
0.232 0.336 0.232
0.220 0.241 0.232 0.242 0.231
-0.012 0.009 0 0.01 -0.001
-0.115 0.087 0 0.096 -0.01
Note:The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark that
is calibrated with data from 1990. The column of Pα represents the result that replaces Pα in 1990 with the
value in 2000 and retains others with the benchmark values. Similar exercises are conducted for the columns
of “α0”, “α1”, and “(α0,α1)”, and the column of “promotion(PM)” is the result derived after replacing Pαand
(α0,α1). In each column of counterfactual analysis, the first row shows the inequality level when replacing the
parameter in 1990 with that in 2000. The second row shows the difference in inequality between the coun-
terfactual case and that of the benchmark, where the negative value means that inequality in counterfactual
case is smaller than that of the benchmark value. The third row shows the ratio of the value in the second
row to the wage inequality change from 1990 to 2000.
Table 11: Counterfactual analysis: residues
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model





Note The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark that
is calibrated with data from 1990. The column of V̄ represents the result that replaces V̄ in 1990 with the
value in 2000 and retains others with the benchmark values. Similar exercises are conducted for the column
of “ρ”, and the column of “residue(RS)” is the result derived after replacing both V̄ and ρ. In each column of
counterfactual analysis, the first row shows the inequality level when replacing the parameter in 1990 with
that in 2000. The second row shows the difference in inequality between the counterfactual case and that
of the benchmark, where the negative value means that the inequality in the counterfactual case is smaller
than that of the benchmark value. The third row shows the ratio of the value in the second row to the wage
inequality change from 1990 to 2000.
19
The counterfactual exercise on the promotion channel involves the following parame-
ters: the promotion offer probability (Pα) and the promotion levels (α0, α1). As shown in
Table 10, the probability of promotion negatively contributes to the increase in inequality
(−11.5%), the promotion level distribution contributes 9.6%, and the overall contribution
of the promotion channel is −1%. In other words, there is an amplification effect when
changing the probability and level at the same time.
The change in wage inequality may be caused by factors that were missed in the
model. To check this, we performed similar counterfactual exercises for (V̄,ρ) to account
for the contribution from residues. Although V̄ and ρ are the parameters of unemploy-
ment utility and elasticity on effort, respectively, they do not necessarily represent the
channels of these two; instead, they represent all the factors being missed in the model.
As shown in Table 11, the remaining part contributes to inequality by 190.4%; hence, the
model still misses a significant portion of the explanation for the increase in inequality.
Table 12: Counterfactual analysis: Decomposition
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model
Preference(PF) match premium (PE) search friction(SF) promotion(PM) residue(RS)(1990) (2000) (1990)
0.232 0.336 0.232
0.184 0.296 0.244 0.231 0.43
-0.048 0.064 0.012 -0.001 0.198
-0.462 0.615 0.115 -0.01 1.904
-0.214 0.284 0.053 -0.005 0.88
Note The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark that
is calibrated in 1990. The columns under “Counterfactual analysis” list the wage inequality under different
counterfactual cases. The first row is the wage inequality level when replacing the parameters in 1990 with
those of 2000 in the counterfactual cases. The second row is the difference in inequality between the counter-
factual case and that in the benchmark. The third row is the ratio of the value in the second row to the wage
change from 1990 to 2000. The fourth row is the standardized value, that is, the ratio of the value in the third
row to the total sum.
To make more sense of the magnitude of each channel, we sum all the contributions
from the five components—preference (PF), match premium (PE), search friction (SF), pro-
motion (PM), and residue (RS)—and computed the ratio of each component to the sum
of them. As reported in Table 12, the first row is the inequality level in the counterfac-
tual cases. The second row is the difference in inequality between the counterfactual case
and the benchmark. The third row is the ratio of the value in the second row to the wage
change from 1990 to 2000. The fourth row is the standardized value, that is, the ratio of the
value in the third row to the sum of them. Subsequently, in this standardized measure-
ment, the contribution of preference, match premium, search friction, and promotion are
−21.4%, 28.4%, 5.3%, and −0.5%, respectively. We think the contribution is still signifi-
cant, given that the wage inequality in this study controls for demographic characteristics,
and the model does not include the worker skill or heterogeneity in firm productivity.
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Table 13: Alternative 1: Parameters in 2000
Parameters Descriptions Value target data model
α0 promotion level (low) 0.32 ls 0.60 0.39
α1 promotion level (high) 0.74 Var 0.34 0.31








τH job amenity(high) 2.90 Vars 0.31 0.30
























Note: The data is from NSCG (2003), which collects the information of 2000, and the targets are the following:
labor share (ls); matched to unmatched employment ratio ( NsNg
) and wage ratio (
Wg
Ws
); matched to unmatched




















wage inequality within matched group (Vars) and total wage inequality (Var).
Table 14: Alternative 1: Decomposition
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model
Preference(PF) match premium (PE) search friction(SF) promotion(PM)(1990) (2000) (1990)
0.232 0.336 0.232
0.308 0.287 0.229 0.212
0.076 0.055 -0.003 -0.02
0.73 0.529 -0.029 -0.192
Note The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark that
is calibrated in 1990. The columns under “Counterfactual analysis” list the wage inequality under different
counterfactual cases. The first row is the wage inequality level when replacing the parameters in 1990 with
those of 2000 in the counterfactual cases. The second row is the difference in inequality between the counter-
factual case and that in the benchmark. The third row is the ratio of the value in the second row to the wage
change from 1990 to 2000.
6 Alternative calibration
While the counterfactual analysis in last section allows all the parameters change from
1990 to 2000, some parameters could be constant across years. To precisely identify which
parameters will change, we need more detailed information, for example, the match qual-
ity, knowledge spread, etc. However, there is no such detailed information in the data.
Hence, in this section, we consider about two alternative calibration strategies. In the first
exercise, we keep V̄ and ρ constant and re-calibrate other parameters. In the model, V̄ and
ρ are the parameters of unemployment utility and elasticity on effort, but as we argued
in last section, it might capture all the other factors that are missed in the model, hence
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Table 15: Alternative 2: Parameters in 2000
Parameters Descriptions Value target data model
α0 promotion level (low) 0.34 ls 0.60 0.50
α1 promotion level (high) 0.99 Var 0.34 0.10








τH job amenity(high) 13.87 Vars 0.31 0.12
























Note: The data is from NSCG (2003), which collects the information of 2000, and the targets are the following:
matched to unmatched employment ratio ( NsNg
) and wage ratio (
Wg
Ws
); matched to unmatched employment











this alternative calibration might change the results significantly. In the second exercise,
we only re-calibrate 5 major parameters– hH, Pα, PL, PM, Pδ– and keep others unchanged.
Note that hH captures the match premium, which subjects to change as the job match
quality change. For other three channels, we recalibrate all the parameters on probability
as these are more likely to respond directly to the policy relating to educational mismatch,
in particular, Pα captures the promotion probability, PL, PM are preference probability dis-
tribution, Pδ is the knowledge spread.
6.1 Alternative 1
In this exercise, we keep V̄ and ρ constant and re-calibrate other parameters, and then
we will do similar counterfactual analysis as in section 5. Table 13 presents the calibration
result where we don’t target unemployment rate (Nu) and wage inequality for unmatched
group (Varg). The main difference between the result and that in Table 6 are that τL and PM
are much smaller, but overall the model matched the data well. The counterfactual results
are presented from Table A.10 to Table A.13. In Table 14, we present the decomposition
results. It shows that match premium still explain a significant part of wage inequality
increase (52.9%) and promotion channel still contribute negatively(−19.2%). However, in
this case, the preference channel contributes it positively (73%) and search friction channel
contributes it negatively(−2.9%), which are different from our bench mark result.
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6.2 Alternative 2
In this exercise, we only re-calibrate 5 major parameters– hH, Pα, PL, PM, Pδ– and keep oth-
ers unchanged. In other words, Pα will represents all of promotion channel, PL, PM will
represents all of preference channel, Pδ will represents all of search friction channel. Cor-
respondingly, we only target 5 moments which are highlighted in Table 15. In this case,




some untargeted moments well, for example, the employment ratio and wage ratio be-
tween matched and unmatched group (
wg
ws
, NsNg ) Counterfactual results are presented from
Table A.14 to Table A.17, and the decomposition result is summarized in Table 16. It
shows that match premium explains a smaller part of wage inequality increase (3.8%); and
the preference also contributes it positively (31.7%); the search friction channel explain a
larger part of wage inequality increase (31.7%); the promotion channel still contribute
negatively but with much larger contribution (−185%).
Table 16: Alternative 2: Decomposition
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model
Preference(PF) match premium (PE) search friction(SF) promotion(PM)(1990) (2000) (1990)
0.232 0.336 0.232
0.265 0.236 0.265 0.04
0.033 0.004 0.033 -0.228
0.317 0.038 0.317 -1.85
Note The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark that
is calibrated in 1990. The columns under “Counterfactual analysis” list the wage inequality under different
counterfactual cases. The first row is the wage inequality level when replacing the parameters in 1990 with
those of 2000 in the counterfactual cases. The second row is the difference in inequality between the counter-
factual case and that in the benchmark. The third row is the ratio of the value in the second row to the wage
change from 1990 to 2000.
7 Conclusion
In the present study, we explained residual wage inequality by introducing educational
mismatch in a structural model. First, we measured the education mismatch in a novel
and direct way by employing a survey data. Subsequently, we identified the underly-
ing reasons behind the mismatch to disentangle different mechanisms contributing to the
inequality. Finally, we found that the educational mismatch affects earnings inequality
significantly and that the impact varies based on the underlying reasons.
The policy implications of this paper are as follow. First, an improvement in the edu-
cation match rate will decrease wage inequality as there is a negative correlation between
inequality and job relatedness. Second, as promotion, preference, and search friction are
the three main reasons behind the mismatch, improving educational signaling and low-
ering market friction to help college graduates better utilize their knowledge could be
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helpful in lowering wage inequality. Third, since the match premium channel explains a
significant part of the increase in wage inequality, the policy on improving match quality
might automatically increase wage inequality. Fourth, this also provide channels to under
the inequality in other countries, for example, China (Piketty et al. (2019),Huang (2019)).
The model could be extended to incorporate dynamics. A worker may update own
preference based on the working experience, and on-the-job learning may increase the
skill match. It could also be extended to include skill and productivity heterogeneity.
Under these two extensions, both preference and search friction may have a higher quan-
titative importance. A third extension would be to turn the heterogeneity of preference
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Appendix
A Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Statistical description: 1990
groups observations tenure earning inequality proportion
gender
Female 34467 18.17 53814.12 0.20 0.39
male 59893 19.73 76401.97 0.26 0.61
education
Bachelor 58063 18.77 61039.09 0.23 0.64
Master 25757 20.17 68416.25 0.20 0.25
PhD 10540 18.68 104475.18 0.32 0.11
race
White 79175 19.16 68444.02 0.24 0.91
Black 9478 19.20 55785.14 0.19 0.06
Hispanic 5707 17.27 62247.22 0.20 0.03
relatedness
Close 55613 18.96 70803.82 0.22 0.56
Some 24066 19.04 67695.83 0.23 0.26
Not 14681 19.69 57021.46 0.28 0.18
all sample 94360 19.11 67514.19 0.23 1
Note: Data source is National Survey of College Graduates (1993) which has the information in 1990. Column
“observations” is the number of observation in the sample; column “tenure” is the average tenure of each
subgroup; “earning” is the average earning in USD in current year value; “inequality” is the residual wage
inequality of each subgroup; “proportion” is the employment share of each subgroup.
Table A.2: Statistical description:2000
groups observations tenure earning inequality proportion
gender
Female 21180 20.13 60732.11 0.28 0.43
male 34285 21.51 90929.36 0.38 0.57
education
Bachelor 31915 20.95 69964.33 0.34 0.64
Master 16202 21.31 77226.22 0.28 0.26
PhD 7348 19.72 131856.72 0.49 0.10
race
White 47212 21.07 79947.82 0.35 0.89
Black 4411 20.70 61798.49 0.25 0.07
Hispanic 3842 18.50 65085.11 0.33 0.05
relatedness
Close 33377 20.45 83487.92 0.30 0.56
Some 13871 21.14 77929.15 0.33 0.26
Not 8217 22.05 61807.33 0.40 0.19
all sample 55465 20.92 78042.82 0.34 1
Note: Data source is National Survey of College Graduates (2003) which has the information in 2000. Column
“observations” is the number of observation in the sample; column “tenure” is the average tenure of each
subgroup; “earning” is the average earning in USD in current year value; “inequality” is the residual wage
inequality of each subgroup; “proportion” is the employment share of each subgroup.
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Table A.3: Statistical description: 2010
groups observations tenure earning inequality proportion
gender
Female 26871 19.21 74392.51 0.34 0.47
male 36619 21.22 111361.32 0.43 0.53
education
Bachelor 32722 20.51 82050.90 0.39 0.65
Master 22924 20.09 96163.92 0.31 0.26
PhD 7844 19.16 170399.52 0.53 0.09
race
White 51949 20.44 96302.70 0.38 0.86
Black 4873 20.54 80507.39 0.43 0.07
Hispanic 6668 18.16 79348.42 0.37 0.08
relatedness
Close 39174 19.92 104512.62 0.35 0.56
Some 16218 20.54 89270.52 0.37 0.26
Not 8098 21.01 67644.66 0.44 0.18
all sample 63490 20.28 93939.57 0.39 1
Note: Data source is National Survey of College Graduates (2013) which has the information in 2010. Column
“observations” is the number of observation in the sample; column “tenure” is the average tenure of each
subgroup; “earning” is the average earning in USD in current year value; “inequality” is the residual wage
inequality of each subgroup; “proportion” is the employment share of each subgroup.
Table A.4: Earnings inequality
year Varraw Varres Var1 Var2
1990 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.18
2000 0.40 0.34 0.31 0.26
2010 0.47 0.39 0.35 0.29
Note: The second column “Varraw” is the earnings inequality with raw data; the third column “Varres” is the
residual wage inequality as in equation (1); the fourth column “Var1” is residual wage inequality after further
controlling major dummy; and the fifth column “Var2 ” is residual wage inequality after further controlling
major, occupation, and match status.
Table A.5: Proportion of match
groups
1990 2000 2010
close some not close some not close some not
gender
Female 0.61 0.21 0.18 0.61 0.22 0.17 0.59 0.23 0.17
Male 0.53 0.29 0.18 0.52 0.29 0.19 0.53 0.29 0.18
education
Bachelor 0.46 0.30 0.24 0.46 0.30 0.24 0.46 0.31 0.23
Master 0.68 0.22 0.10 0.68 0.22 0.10 0.69 0.22 0.09
PhD 0.88 0.08 0.04 0.87 0.09 0.04 0.88 0.09 0.03
race
White 0.59 0.26 0.15 0.60 0.25 0.15 0.56 0.27 0.17
Black 0.60 0.22 0.18 0.59 0.24 0.17 0.54 0.26 0.20
Hispanic 0.61 0.23 0.15 0.66 0.21 0.13 0.58 0.23 0.19
all sample 0.56 0.26 0.18 0.56 0.26 0.19 0.56 0.26 0.19
Note: Data source is National Survey of College Graduates (1993,2003,2013). Column “close” is the pro-
portion of people who reported “closely related”; column “some” is the proportion of people who reported
“somewhat related”; column “not” is the proportion of people who reported “not related at all”.
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Table A.6: Reasons for mismatch
Reason 1990 2000 2010
Pay, promotion opportunities 0.32 0.32 0.29
Working conditions [hours, equip., working envir.] 0.08 0.10 0.09
Job location 0.04 0.06 0.07
Change in career or professional interests 0.20 0.20 0.19
Family-related reasons 0.08 0.10 0.10
Job in highest degree field not available 0.16 0.14 0.18
Others 0.12 0.07 0.08
Note: Column “1990”, “2000”, “2010” is the percentage of people reporting different mismatch reasons
among the people who reported “not related at all” for the year of 1990, 2000, 2010, respectively.
Table A.7: Reasons for mismatch: exp ≤ 10
Reasons 1990 2000 2010
Pay, promotion opportunities 0.30 0.35 0.27
Working conditions [hours, equip., working envir.] 0.07 0.09 0.09
Job location 0.04 0.05 0.05
Change in career or professional interests 0.18 0.22 0.15
Family-related reasons 0.07 0.08 0.07
Job in highest degree field not available 0.21 0.17 0.28
Others 0.12 0.05 0.09
Note: Column “1990”, “2000”, “2010” is the percentage of people reporting different mismatch reasons
among the people who reported “not related at all” for the year of 1990, 2000, 2010, respectively. This ta-
ble only includes workers with an experience of no more than 10 years.
Table A.8: Wage ratio to matched group
Reasons
raw data residue
1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010
Pay, promotion opportunities 0.98 0.94 0.89 1.02 1.00 0.99
Working conditions [hours, equip., working envir.] 0.74 0.66 0.59 0.78 0.73 0.66
Job location 0.68 0.64 0.57 0.72 0.69 0.65
Change in career or professional interests 0.85 0.76 0.74 0.89 0.81 0.81
Family-related reasons 0.70 0.59 0.52 0.78 0.66 0.59
Job in highest degree field not available 0.66 0.60 0.49 0.72 0.67 0.59
Others 0.74 0.71 0.57 0.79 0.75 0.65
Note: The column “raw data” presents the raw wage ratio of the mismatched group (under different reasons)
to the matched group for 1990, 2000, and 2010. The column “residue” presents the residual wage ratio (after
controlling for demographic characteristics) of the mismatched group to the matched group for 1990, 2000,
and 2010.
29
Table A.9: Wage ratio to matched group: exp ≤ 10
Reasons
raw data residue
1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010
Pay, promotion opportunities 0.92 0.94 0.82 0.98 1.01 0.92
Working conditions [hours, equip., working envir.] 0.74 0.80 0.61 0.80 0.88 0.67
Job location 0.70 0.72 0.59 0.73 0.81 0.72
Change in career or professional interests 0.78 0.77 0.69 0.84 0.83 0.80
Family-related reasons 0.76 0.56 0.70 0.81 0.64 0.81
Job in highest degree field not available 0.64 0.58 0.52 0.71 0.66 0.63
Others 0.66 0.71 0.60 0.75 0.75 0.67
Note: The column “raw data” presents the raw wage ratio of the mismatched group (under different reasons)
to the matched group for 1990, 2000, and 2010. The column “residue” presents the residual wage ratio (after
controlling for demographic characteristics) of the mismatched group to the matched group for 1990, 2000,
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Match and Inequality: NSCG2013
Note: This figure shows the correlation between major relatedness and within-major inequality. The relat-
edness is defined as the percentage of people who responds “very close”. In each panel, a dot represents a
major, the x-axis is the relatedness in that major, and the y-axis is the residual wage inequality (var(ǫ)) within
that major. The left, middle, and right panels represent the results for 1990, 2000, and 2010, respectively.
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Match and Inequality: NSCG2013
Note: This figure shows the correlation between major relatedness and within-major inequality. The related-
ness here is defined as the percentage of people who responds “some close” or “very close”. In each panel, a
dot represents a major, the x-axis is the relatedness in that major, and the y-axis is the residual wage inequal-
ity (var(ǫ)) within that major. The left, middle, and right panels represent the results for 1990, 2000, and 2010,
respectively.
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Match and Inequality: NSCG2013
Note: This figure shows the correlation between job (occupation) relatedness and within-job inequality. The
relatedness is defined as the percentage of people who responds “very close”. In each panel, a dot represents
an occupation, the x-axis is the job relatedness in that occupation, and the y-axis is the residual wage inequal-
ity (var(ǫ)) within that occupation. The left, middle, and right panels represent the results for 1990, 2000, and
2010, respectively.
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Match and Inequality: NSCG2013
Note: This figure shows the correlation between job (occupation) relatedness and within-job inequality. The
relatedness here is defined as the percentage of people who responds “some close” or “very close”. In each
panel, a dot represents an occupation, the x-axis is the job relatedness in that occupation, and the y-axis is
the residual wage inequality (var(ǫ)) within that occupation. The left, middle, and right panels represent the
results for 1990, 2000, and 2010, respectively.
Figure A.4: Job relatedness (occupation) and wage inequality
Table A.10: Alternative 1: Preference
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model
τL τH (τL, τH) (PL, PM, PH) Preference(PF)(1990) (2000) (1990)
0.232 0.336 0.232
0.46 0.154 0.353 0.211 0.308
0.228 -0.078 0.121 -0.021 0.076
2.19 -0.75 1.163 -0.202 0.73
Note: The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark that
is calibrated with the data for 1990. The columns under “Counterfactual analysis” list the wage inequality
under different counterfactual cases. The column τL represents the result that replaces τL in 1990 with the
value in 2000 and retains others with the benchmark values. Similar exercises are conducted for the columns
of “τH”, “(τL, τH)”, and “(PL, PM, PH)”, and the column of “Preference(PF)” is the result derived after replac-
ing (τL, τH) and (PL, PM, PH). In each column of the counterfactual analysis, the first row shows the inequality
level when replacing the parameter in 1990 with that in 2000. The second row shows the difference in inequal-
ity between the counterfactual case and that of the benchmark, where a negative value implies that inequality
in the counterfactual case is smaller than that of the benchmark value. The third row shows the ratio of the
value in the second row to the wage inequality change from 1990 to 2000.
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Table A.11: Alternative 1: Match premium
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model





Note: The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark
that is calibrated with data from 1990. The column of “(hH)match premium(PE)” represents the result that
replaces hH in 1990 with the value in 2000 and retains others with the benchmark values. In the column of
counterfactual analysis, the first row shows the inequality level when replacing the parameter in 1990 with
that in 2000. The second row shows the difference in inequality between the counterfactual case and that
of the benchmark, where the negative value means that the inequality in the counterfactual case is smaller
than that of the benchmark value. The third row shows the ratio of the value in the second row to the wage
inequality change from 1990 to 2000.
Table A.12: Alternative 1: Search friction
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model
Pδ Pf Ps search_friction(SF)(1990) (2000) (1990)
0.232 0.336 0.232
0.221 0.232 0.238 0.229
-0.011 0 0.006 -0.003
-0.106 0 0.058 -0.029
Note: The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark
that is calibrated with data from 1990. The column of “Pδ” represents the result that replaces Pδ in 1990
with the value in 2000 and retains others with benchmark values. Similar exercises are conducted for the
columns of “Pf ” and “Ps”, and the column of “search_friction(SF)” is the result that is derived after replacing
(Pδ, Pf , Ps). In each column of the counterfactual analysis, the first row shows the inequality level when
replacing the parameter in 1990 with that in 2000. The second row shows the difference in inequality between
the counterfactual case and that of the benchmark, where the negative value means that inequality the in
counterfactual case is smaller than that of the benchmark value. The third row shows the ratio of the value
in the second row to the wage inequality change from 1990 to 2000.
Table A.13: Alternative 1: promotion
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model
Pα α0 α1 (α0, α1) promotion(PM)(1990) (2000) (1990)
0.232 0.336 0.232
0.222 0.236 0.222 0.223 0.212
-0.01 0.004 -0.01 -0.009 -0.02
-0.096 0.038 -0.096 -0.087 -0.192
Note:The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark that
is calibrated with data from 1990. The column of Pα represents the result that replaces Pα in 1990 with the
value in 2000 and retains others with the benchmark values. Similar exercises are conducted for the columns
of “α0”, “α1”, and “(α0,α1)”, and the column of “promotion(PM)” is the result derived after replacing Pαand
(α0,α1). In each column of counterfactual analysis, the first row shows the inequality level when replacing the
parameter in 1990 with that in 2000. The second row shows the difference in inequality between the coun-
terfactual case and that of the benchmark, where the negative value means that inequality in counterfactual
case is smaller than that of the benchmark value. The third row shows the ratio of the value in the second
row to the wage inequality change from 1990 to 2000.
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Table A.14: Alternative 2: Preference
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model





Note: The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark that
is calibrated with the data for 1990. The columns under “Counterfactual analysis” list the wage inequality
under different counterfactual cases. The column τL represents the result that replaces τL in 1990 with the
value in 2000 and retains others with the benchmark values. Similar exercises are conducted for the columns
of “τH”, “(τL, τH)”, and “(PL, PM, PH)”, and the column of “Preference(PF)” is the result derived after replac-
ing (τL, τH) and (PL, PM, PH). In each column of the counterfactual analysis, the first row shows the inequality
level when replacing the parameter in 1990 with that in 2000. The second row shows the difference in inequal-
ity between the counterfactual case and that of the benchmark, where a negative value implies that inequality
in the counterfactual case is smaller than that of the benchmark value. The third row shows the ratio of the
value in the second row to the wage inequality change from 1990 to 2000.
Table A.15: Alternative 2: Match premium
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model





Note: The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark
that is calibrated with data from 1990. The column of “(hH)match premium(PE)” represents the result that
replaces hH in 1990 with the value in 2000 and retains others with the benchmark values. In the column of
counterfactual analysis, the first row shows the inequality level when replacing the parameter in 1990 with
that in 2000. The second row shows the difference in inequality between the counterfactual case and that
of the benchmark, where the negative value means that the inequality in the counterfactual case is smaller
than that of the benchmark value. The third row shows the ratio of the value in the second row to the wage
inequality change from 1990 to 2000.
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Table A.16: Alternative 2: Search friction
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model





Note: The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark
that is calibrated with data from 1990. The column of “Pδ” represents the result that replaces Pδ in 1990
with the value in 2000 and retains others with benchmark values. Similar exercises are conducted for the
columns of “Pf ” and “Ps”, and the column of “search_friction(SF)” is the result that is derived after replacing
(Pδ, Pf , Ps). In each column of the counterfactual analysis, the first row shows the inequality level when
replacing the parameter in 1990 with that in 2000. The second row shows the difference in inequality between
the counterfactual case and that of the benchmark, where the negative value means that inequality the in
counterfactual case is smaller than that of the benchmark value. The third row shows the ratio of the value
in the second row to the wage inequality change from 1990 to 2000.
Table A.17: Alternative 2: promotion
Wage inequality Counterfactual analysis
data data model





Note:The columns under “Wage inequality” list the inequality from 1990, 2000, and from the benchmark that
is calibrated with data from 1990. The column of Pα represents the result that replaces Pα in 1990 with the
value in 2000 and retains others with the benchmark values. Similar exercises are conducted for the columns
of “α0”, “α1”, and “(α0,α1)”, and the column of “promotion(PM)” is the result derived after replacing Pαand
(α0,α1). In each column of counterfactual analysis, the first row shows the inequality level when replacing the
parameter in 1990 with that in 2000. The second row shows the difference in inequality between the coun-
terfactual case and that of the benchmark, where the negative value means that inequality in counterfactual
case is smaller than that of the benchmark value. The third row shows the ratio of the value in the second
row to the wage inequality change from 1990 to 2000.
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B Appendix of benchmark model
Stationary Equilibrium An equilibrium consists employment allocation {NU , Ns, Ng0, Ng1},
where NU is the number of unemployment, Ns is the employment in matched job , Ng0is
the employment in mismatched job with promotion level α0, Ng1 is the employment in
mismatched job with promotion level α1. Every period workers make occupational choice
based on current status (α, τ, h) to maximize the expected utility {VU , Vs(τ), Vg(α)}, and
in the stationary equilibrium(Eq1), the employment distribution requires following con-
ditions.
1. The unemployed workers include unlucky job seekers and unlucky employed work-
ers, as follows.
NU = NU(1 − Pf ) + (Ng0 + Ng1 + Ns)Ps
2. The workers in mismatched jobs with promotion α0 come from lucky job seekers,
stayers, and switchers from matched jobs due to low amenity.
Ng0 = NU Pf (1 − Pδ) + Ng0(1 − Ps)[(1 − Pδ) + PδPL] + Ns(1 − Ps)(1 − Pδ)(1 − Pα)PL
3. The workers in mismatched job with promotion α1 are stayers and switchers from
matched jobs due to promotion.
Ng1 = Ng1(1 − Ps) + Ns(1 − Ps)(1 − Pδ)Pα
4. The workers in matched job are lucky job seekers, switchers from mismatched jobs,
and stayers.
Ns = NU Pf Pδ + Ng0(1− Ps)Pδ(PH + PM)+ Ns(1− Ps)[Pδ +(1− Pδ)(1− Pα)(PH + PM)]
5. The total number of labor force is normalized to 1, leading to the following.
1 = NU + Ng0 + Ng1 + Ns
Employment Let NPF, NPM, NSF be the mismatched employment due to preference, pro-
motion, and search friction, respectively. NsL, NsM, NsH are the number of workers in
matched job with preference of τL, τM, τH, respectively. Employment in an mismatched
job that comes from stayers with different promotion levels and switchers from matched
jobs due to preference is
NPF = Ng0(1 − Ps)PδPL + Ng1(1 − Ps)PδPL + Ns(1 − Ps)(1 − Pδ)PL. (2)
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Employment in an mismatched job that comes from stayers and switchers from matched
jobs due to promotion is
NPM = Ng1(1 − Ps)Pδ(PM + PH) + Ns(1 − Ps)(1 − Pδ)Pα(PM + PH). (3)
Employment in an mismatched job that comes from lucky job seekers receiving offers of
mismatched jobs and stayers with different promotion levels who did not receive an offer
of a matched job due to search friction is
NSF = NU Pf (1 − Pδ) + Ng0(1 − Ps)(1 − Pδ) + Ng1(1 − Ps)(1 − Pδ). (4)
Employment in a matched job with low job amenity that comes from lucky job seekers
and stayers is
NsL = NU Pf PδPL + Ns(1 − Ps)PδPL (5)
Employment in matched jobs with medium job amenity that comes from lucky job seek-
ers, switchers from mismatched jobs with promotions of α0, and stayers is
NsM = NU Pf PδPM + Ng0(1 − Ps)PδPM + Ns(1 − Ps)(1 − Pδ)(1 − Pα)PM + Ns(1 − Ps)PδPM.
(6)
Employment in matched jobs with high job amenity that comes from lucky job seekers,
switchers from mismatched jobs, and stayers is
NsH = NU Pf PδPH + Ng0(1 − Ps)PδPH + Ns(1 − Ps)[(1 − Pδ)(1 − Pα) + Pα]PH. (7)
Wages Let wPF, wPM, wSF be the wage of mismatched workers due to preference, pro-
motion, and search friction, respectively; wsL, wsM, wsH are the wages of matched workers
with the preference τL, τM, τH, respectively; wg, ws are the average wage of mismatched
and matched workers, respectively. Given the wage function w(α, h, τ) = [(αh)1−ρτ]
1
θ−ρ ,
the wage in mismatched job due to preference is the average wage among workers with
different promotion levels.
wPF = w(α0, hL, τM)[Ng0(1 − Ps)PδPL + Ns(1 − Ps)(1 − Pδ)(1 − Pα)PL]/NPF (8)
+ w(α1, hL, τM)[Ns(1 − Ps)(1 − Pδ)PαPL + Ng1(1 − Ps)PδPL]/NPF
Similarly, the wage in mismatched jobs due to search friction is the average wage among
workers of different promotion levels.
wSF = w(α0, hL, τM)[NU Pf (1 − Pδ) + Ng0(1 − Ps)(1 − Pδ)]/NSF (9)
+ w(α1, hL, τM)[Ng1(1 − Ps)(1 − Pδ)]/NSF
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Given that other wages are the same for workers in the same group, the following holds.
wPM = w(α1, hL, τM) (10)
wsL = w(α0, hH, τL) (11)
wsM = w(α0, hH, τM) (12)
wsH = w(α0, hH, τH) (13)










w(α0, hH, τj) (15)
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